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Much of the current cultural debate about marriage in the United States focuses on the need for
children to be raised by heterosexual married couples. In the current atmosphere, it is important
to examine how marriage functions in contexts where parent-child relationships are determined
by more than just genetics and marital presumptions. This Article argues that the favoritism
toward marriage in adoption and assisted reproduction relates neither to the purposes of
marriage nor to child welfare. Part I subjects marital restrictions on assisted reproduction to an
interpretivist microscope, and Part II undertakes a comprehensive comparison of step-parent
adoption and second-parent adoption. Both Parts raise concerns that are further addressed in
Part III’s look at how the contemporary marriage movement, in advocating for favored
treatment of married couples at all levels of society, ultimately undermines the welfare of
children whose best hope lies with parents for whom marriage is not an option.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the current cultural debate about marriage in the United States focuses on
whether children need to be raised by heterosexual married couples. On one side of the
spectrum, the Human Rights Campaign urges policymakers to take note of the many same-sex
couples who are raising children and are doing so well. On the other side, marriage-movement
groups like the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family claim that society is imperiled
whenever a child is not raised by a heterosexual married couple.3
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See Margery Beck, Senators React to Advertisement, JOURNAL STAR (Omaha), June 29, 2004;
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2004.
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In the current atmosphere, it is important to examine how marriage functions in contexts
where parent-child relationships are determined by the state rather than through the application
of natural-law principles. One of these is adoption, where the state plays the primary role in
naming new parents for an adoptable child. Another is assisted reproduction, where traditional
approaches to parentage often fail to identify the parents of a child born via unfamiliar methods
of reproduction. In both of these contexts, the state undertakes to assess whether those
petitioning for a declaration of parentage are fit to be parents and whether the child’s being
raised in the home they offer is in that child’s best interests.
This Article argues that the favoritism toward marriage in adoption and assisted
reproduction relates neither to the purposes of marriage nor to child welfare. Part I subjects
marital restrictions on access to assisted reproduction to an interpretivist microscope and
concludes that using marriage as a gatekeeper in that context conflicts with the value our society
places on consistency, neutrality and integrity in the law. Part II begins with a comprehensive
comparison assisted reproduction and adoption and then examines the role of the law in
regulating step-parent adoption and second-parent adoption. Part II criticizes in particular how
marriage functions as a proxy for the parental fitness of individuals who seek to adopt their stepchildren and reveals the wrongheadedness of the possible justifications for allowing marriage to
play this role. Part II concludes with an argument for harmonizing the law of step-parent and
second-parent adoption. Both Parts I and II raise concerns that are further addressed in Part III’s
look at how the contemporary marriage movement, in advocating for favored treatment of
married couples at all levels of society, ultimately undermines the welfare of children whose best
hope lies with parents for whom marriage is not an option.
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I. MARRIAGE AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Marriage has played a prominent role in the development of the law and policy that
govern assisted reproduction. The effect has been to restrict the use of assisted reproduction to
those in socially sanctioned intimate relationships and to erect barriers to its use against those
who are not. While these barriers are no longer as salient in the artificial insemination context as
they once were, they continue to exist and to be particularly prominent in the regulation of
surrogacy.

A. Marriage and Artificial Insemination
Whereas artificial insemination was once considered adulterous,4 restriction of the use of
this technology to married couples is becoming less and less common. The Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA), as first promulgated in 1973, contained a section addressing the use of artificial
insemination by married couples.5 The Act provided that if, under the supervision of a
physician, a wife were artificially inseminated with a donor’s semen and with the consent of her
husband, the husband would be the father of the resulting child.6 The UPA further provided that
a donor of semen to a licensed physician was not the father of a resulting child unless the woman
artificially inseminated was his wife.7 These provisions did not prohibit single women from
being artificially inseminated; they merely prevented single women from becoming the sole
parents of their children through artificial insemination. The language referring to married
couples and licensed physicians was eliminated in 2000 in order to “provide[ ] certainty of
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See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
5
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
6
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
7
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 408 (2001).
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nonparentage for prospective donors.”8 The new provisions permit single women to become the
sole parents of the children born to them via artificial insemination.9 Notably, the language of
the new UPA, unlike that of the former UPA, is inclusive not only of unmarried women,10 but
also of unmarried opposite-sex couples, whether or not those couples are intimately involved
with each other.11 The provision is said to “reflect[] concern for the best interests of nonmarital
as well as marital children of assisted reproduction . . . .”12
Most states regulate access to and the ramifications of artificial insemination in one way
or another. Some states specifically ban the use of artificial insemination by any but married
couples,13 a more restrictive position than even that taken by the 1973 UPA. Some states
adopted the language of the 1973 UPA without revision14 or otherwise employed language that
referred only to married couples.15 Other states altered the UPA’s provisions slightly so as not to

8

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) (“The donor can neither sue to
establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to support the resulting child. In sum, donors
are eliminated from the parental equation.”).
10
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) (“UPA (2000) further opts not
to limit nonparenthood of a donor to situations in which the donor provides sperm for assisted
reproduction by a married woman.”).
11
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. __ (Supp. 2003); cf. Angela Mae Kupenda, Two
Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two Single, African-American Adults Who Are Not in a
Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other Should Be Allowed
to Jointly Adopt and Co-parent African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703
(1997).
12
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. __ (Supp. 2003).
13
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553 (1998).
14
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §
210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2)
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Michie
2000). A married woman is, of course, not required to obtain the consent of her husband to be
artificially inseminated. See Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 2000).
15
ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); FLA. STAT. ch.
742.11(1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 4B; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West
5
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sever the paternity of the donor where the recipient’s husband did not consent to the
insemination.16 Such provisions do not explicitly disallow single women from employing
artificial insemination, but courts construing them have found no protection for single women
who want to use these provisions to combat assertions of paternity by sperm donors.17 Another
group of states addressed this problem by severing the paternity of the donor in all cases where
the recipient was not the donor’s wife.18 In this respect, these statutes mirror the language of the
new UPA, which provides likewise.19 None of this is to suggest, however, that single women do
not nonetheless experience discrimination based on marital status in the provision of artificial
insemination by private clinics.20 When they do and elect to self-inseminate with the sperm of a

1997); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-6-106 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 551-53 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996). But see In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d
608, 609 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1996) (statute applied to woman unmarried at time of birth who later
married).
16
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998);
FLA. STAT. ch. 742.11 (1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 40/2 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46,
§ 4B (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. §
168-B:3(II) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-11-6(A) (Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
73(1) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996).
17
See R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three—or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family
after the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231, 240 (2000).
18
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(1) (Michie 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. § 3111.95(B) (Anderson 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239(1) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.050(2) (2001); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(2) (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103(b) (Michie
2001). But see Shin, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310 (concluding statute does not apply where husband’s
consent not obtained) (citing Jhordan C. v. Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537-38 (Ct. App. 1986).
19
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703, 9B U.L.A. 355, 356 (2001).
20
See Charo, supra note 17, at 241; Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal
Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 150-51 (2000); Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without
6

known donor,21 they run the risk that courts will apply the distinction between known and
unknown sperm donors that has been so prominent in the case law,22 despite statutory plain
language,23 and recognize the paternity of the donor.24 The distinction, curiously, is nowhere
acknowledged in the new UPA.25

Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 175 (1996); Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 LAW
& INEQ. 65, 82 (2001); see also Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social
Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of
Liberal Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197, 1217 (1995-96) (noting disparities based on race in the
provision of fertility services); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 935, 940-42 (1996) (suggesting underlying causes of racial disparity in fertility
treatment).
21
See DeLair, supra note 20, at 163.
22
See Charo, supra note 17, at 241-42, 247. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d
356, 357, 362 (App. Div. 1994); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (statutory protection of
recipient does not apply where parties had an agreement that donor’s parental rights would be
preserved); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9,11 (1994) (same); In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting ruling that “the act does not intend to bar a known donor
from trying to assert his parental rights”). But see McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243 (Or.
1989) (holding statute applies even where physician does not perform insemination, donor is not
anonymous, and recipient is unmarried); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (known donor not entitled to legal recognition of paternity because he agreed not to assert
paternity); In re Matthew B, 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate stipulated to
the paternity of the intending father).
23
See, e.g., In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting ruling that act
barring paternity claim by donor who is not the wife of the recipient did not apply to bar a known
donor from trying to assert his parental rights); see Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby
Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
835, 904 (2000) (“[A]lthough facially neutral, the law discriminates in practice between sperm
donors who give directly to users and those who give to sperm banks.”).
24
See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Ct. App. 1986). Similarly, whereas a
sperm donor’s agreement not to assert paternity may be enforceable, see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875
P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), an agreement releasing a sperm donor from any obligation for
child support in exchange for his sperm is not, see Ferguson v. McKiernan, No. J. A15043-04
(Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 22, 2004).
25
Indeed, some language appears to invite courts to continue drawing the distinction. Professor
John Sampson, who served as the reporter for the new UPA, has commented that a donor who
intends to be a father “can be found not to be a ‘donor’ [, since] if the understanding between
him and the mother was that they intended him to have parental rights, . . . “ he would resemble a
husband who contributes his own sperm to be used by his wife for assisted reproduction. See
7

Institutions and commentators have assumed various positions on restricting artificial
insemination in some way relating to marriage. On one extreme is the Catholic Church, which
simply disapproves of assisted reproduction in any form. Others believe regulations limiting
artificial insemination to married couples violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.26 As a policy matter, many disapprove of single parenthood and revile the growing
single-motherhood-by- choice movement made possible by the lowering of discriminatory
barriers to artificial insemination.27 Others more specifically disapprove of “special” rules for
artificial insemination that allow single women to become sole parents but withhold the same
option from single women who have children via coitus.28 At least some of this concern about
single motherhood appears related to concerns about legitimacy and support for children.29
Although the debate over sole legal parenthood for single women who employ artificial
insemination continues, and although single women will continue to face private discrimination

Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (with Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson, Reporter), 35
FAM. L. Q. 83, 162 n.73 (2001). The inclusion of unmarried opposite-sex couples in the 2002
revisions of the UPA may be an attempt to address the status of known donors.
26
See In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (“[T]he court [is unaware] of any distinction, based
upon marital status, being mandated by law with regard to a woman’s right to be artificially
inseminated. It might very well be unconstitutional for the law to try to make such a
distinction.”) (citing Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)); Note, Reproductive
Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 682, 683-84
(1985); Garrison, supra note 24, at 911 n.341 (reasoning from right-of-privacy jurisprudence that
“the state cannot deny access to a means of achieving pregnancy based on marital status.”).
27
See, e.g., Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Decline of Marriage as the Social Basis of
Childrearing, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 3, 5
(David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain, et al., eds. 1996) (in a chapter on how it is best for
children to be raised by their married parents, describing “single mothers by choice” as women
who are committed more to expressing their individuality than to the welfare of their children)
[hereinafter PROMISES].
28
See Garrison, supra note 24, at 843, 873, 879, 882.
29
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 357 (2001). If the husband and wife have
not lived together since her insemination, and if the husband never held the child out as his own,
8

from fertility clinics, at the level of law policy marriage has by and large lost its force as a
regulatory barrier to artificial insemination.

his lawsuit may be brought at any time. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(b), 9B U.L.A. 357
(2001)
9

B. Marriage and Surrogacy
Although most statutes governing surrogacy simply outlaw the practice,30 a few states
have enacted provisions that permit certain individuals to become parents via surrogacy.31 Most
of these statutory schemes permit only married couples to commission surrogates for this
purpose.32 Thus, unlike in the context of assisted reproduction, marriage remains a controlling
influence on the law and policy governing surrogacy.
Most of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law’s (NCCUSL)
enactments on surrogacy have restricted the use of surrogacy to married couples. The 1973
version of the UPA did not address surrogacy, but in the 1980's, the Commission promulgated a
uniform act known as the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA).
The USCACA embodied two options relating to surrogacy, one, Option A, permitting it but
closely regulating it, the other, Option B, outlawing surrogacy. The act was largely unsuccessful
and was repealed by the 2000 overhaul of the UPA. As a part of this overhaul, NCCUSL
promulgated a comprehensive set of provisions which governed the ability of married couples to
commission surrogates, which incorporated the USCACA with little change but the elimination
of Option B.
In 2002, NCCUSL again revamped the UPA’s Article 8 to eliminate the restriction on the
use of surrogacy to married couples. The change permits married or unmarried heterosexual
30

See Garrison, supra note 24, at 851.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2) (Harrison 2001);
NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III)
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
31

32

Statutes in Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia all contain provisions requiring at least
one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2)
(Harrison 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III)(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
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couples to engage a surrogate. Whether this change of position was due to the tepid response of
legislatures or the vociferous opposition by the American Bar Association (ABA) to the UPA has
not been made public. What is known is that family-law expert Professor Joan Heifetz Hollinger
served as a liaison between NCCUSL and the ABA in a vigorous and sustained effort “to ensure
that the principle of equal treatment of all children without regard to the marital status of their
parents [was] followed throughout the new UPA.”33 Hollinger argued that a child born to an
unmarried man and woman, including children born through assisted reproduction or in the
context of a gestational agreement, should have the same rights and relationship with his or her
parents or intended parents as a child born to a married couple. Her successful effort seems to
have been motivated less by purely constitutional concerns as by the need to align the legal
treatment of marital and nonmarital children, the hallmark of the UPA since its original
promulgation in 1973.34
Like the USCACA, the UPA’s Article 8 in either its former or new-and-improved form
has been of little interest to legislative bodies. Only two states, Virginia and North Dakota, made
use of the USCACA, and only Texas, the home state of the reporter of new UPA, enacted the
2000 form of Article 8, albeit with some revisions. Utah, the home state of another reporter,
considered enacting Article 8 in its 2000 form, but that initiative was defeated in the 2004
legislative session.35 As for the 2002 form of Article 8, a bill in substantially that form was
introduced in Illinois but was left pending in committee at the end of the 2004 legislative

33

Newsletter, Family and Juvenile Law Section, Association of American Law Schools, May
2003.
34
See In re Raphael P., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Johnson v.
Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (1993)).
35
SB 45; http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/htmdoc/sbillhtm/sb0045s02.htm.
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session.36 A bill brought in Maine expanded the scope of Article 8 to permit an individual as
well as couples to engage a surrogate, but the bill also died in committee at the end of the
session.37 No legislature is currently considering the enactment of any form of Article 8.

C. Interpreting Marriage-based Restrictions on Assisted Reproduction
In 2002, I argued that functional theories of parenthood–not marriage–are what support
intentional parentage in the context of assisted reproduction.38 In the course of my analysis, I
took issue with Professor Marsha Garrison’s argument that no good policy justifies different
parentage rules for assisted reproduction cases than apply to children born of coitus.39 Although
I disagree with Garrison’s articulation of traditional parentage principles and her views on
parentage-determination policy in assisted-reproduction cases, I did state then and continue to
believe that her “interpretive approach” has much to offer policymakers. The approach, for
example, helps demonstrate that marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy conflict with sound
social policy.

1. The “Interpretive Approach”
Garrison’s interpretive approach is borrowed from the work of tax scholar Professor
Edward McCaffery40 and is called “interpretivism” by McCaffery and constitutional law
36

HB 4742;
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=4742&GAID=3&DocTypeID=H
B&LegID=9341&SessionID=3
37

38

LD 1851; http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280012496.

Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional
Approach to Parentage, 53 HAST. L.J. 597 (2002).
39
See id. at 632-39.
40
See Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV.
41, 46 n.30 (1998) [hereinafter Garrison, Evaluation]. In his article, The Uneasy Case for
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scholars.41 Interpretivism is an interpretive approach supportive of the living Constitution and
other doctrines that grew out of the critical legal studies and process theory movements and that
undergirds American liberalism.42
Garrison invokes McCaffery’s approach to policy formulation by asking family
policymakers to engage in a multi-principle dialectic consisting of constitutional requirements,
contemporary laws, and legislative trends.43 Doing so affords policymakers awareness of
society’s actual practices and beliefs44 and thereby to leaven their rulemaking with consistency45
and neutrality,46 avoiding the myopia of “top-down” argumentation, mere intuition, or
sloganeering. The result is family policy of integrity,47 respectful of family law’s expressive
function,48 and commanding broad public support.49 Applied in any legal context, interpretivism

Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J.283, 286- 87 (1994), McCaffery describes his preferred
method of policy formulation: “The political freedom to seek new answers makes more
important the grounding of [policy] on the at least implicit ideas and conceptions of a modern
democratic society, and calls for a more careful and sensitive reading of our actual practices.
Careful and sensitive interpretation, in turn, helps to lead politics to reasonable answers.” Id. at
287.
41
Id. at 287. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975); Thomas Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). Mark Tushnet criticizes the
interpretive and neutral-principles approaches to constitutional interpretation in Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983), finding these approaches internally incoherent.
42
See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
43
See Garrison, supra note 24, at 844, 845, 878, 901.
44
See id. at 842. “A core tenet of interpretivism is that meaningful actions and beliefs
substantially constitute social life.” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY:
PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE LAW 247 (1997).
45
See id. at 842, 878, 911.
46
See id. at 897 (“gender neutrality may be constitutionally required”); 920.
47
See id. at 879.
48
The expressive function of the law refers to how it signals “the underlying attitudes of a
community or society.” Richard McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339, 340 (2000). On the expressive function of family law, see Carol Weisbrod, On the
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989).
13

resembles the analogical reasoning that characterizes the traditional process of judicial
decisionmaking.50 At the same time, given its emphasis on consistency and neutrality in the law,
interpretivism appears to set the standard for legislation on a higher than merely rational basis,
somewhere in the broadly undefined realm of heightened scrutiny. In other words, an
“uncommonly silly law” that would survive rational basis scrutiny, then, might well fail to meet
the demands of interpretivism. Rational basis with bite (see Kramer U. of Ill. Article).

2. Interpretivism and Marriage-Based Restrictions on Surrogacy
Marriage has been an important part of social systems worldwide for millennia. Its value
to contemporary American society is primarily as a socially sanctioned locus for sexual activity,
procreation, and support for children. Despite the importance of marriage to society generally,
an interpretivist stance with regard to marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy demonstrates that
such restrictions run counter to sound social policy. First, surrogacy legislation has nothing to do
with the primary purposes of marriage–the legitimation of sexual activity and the legitimation of
children. Second, the marital relationship of the intending parents is insufficient to guarantee
two-parent support for the children born of surrogacy. Third, marriage-based restrictions on
surrogacy do not encourage marriage. Finally and perhaps most important, marriage-based
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restrictions on surrogacy conflict with interpretivism’s commitment to consistency and neutrality
in the law. For all of these reasons, marital-status exclusions in the law of surrogacy lack the
legal integrity that is interpretivism’s overriding objective.

a. Sexual Intercourse
Marriage apologists tend to extol marriage with great generality. It has been lauded as
the foundation of the family, as essential to the advancement of civilization, as essential to the
propagation of humanity, and even as critical to economic prosperity. While it is tempting to
agree with such globalizing statements, the purpose of marriage, according to a meticulously
documented article by Professor Sally Goldfarb, is heterosexual intercourse.51 Goldfarb’s
assiduous research into this question is further bolstered by its consistency with the longstanding
belief that sexual activity outside of marriage is corrosive of the social fabric. Marriage has
always been thought an effective repository for sexual energies that if left unregulated would
wreak havoc on the integrity of society.52 As a theoretical and practical matter, marriage makes
sex legitimate for and readily available to the marital couple, effectively diminishing their need
to expend energy and resources pursuing sexual partners.
It goes without saying that these beliefs about the proper place for sex have nothing to do
with assisted reproduction. Indeed, sexual intercourse has explicitly been defined as lying
51

See Sally Goldfarb, Family Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality: Questioning the
Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 285, 287, 288, 293, 295, 296, 301 (1998).
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This notion has resonance in religious writings explaining how “[m]arriage takes the demon
out of sexual intercourse.” JAMES H. OLTHUIS, I PLEDGE YOU MY TROTH 33 (1975). It is also
consistent with the notion that marriage is not simply for procreation, but is “first of all for the
partners . . . .” Id. at 45. The Catholic Church’s Canon 1055 contains a similar idea: Marriage is
“ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of children . . . .”
MICHAEL SMITH FOSTER, ANNULMENT: THE WEDDING THAT WASN’T 12 (1999). Indeed, an
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beyond the scope of assisted reproduction. It would defy logic, then, to argue that marriagebased restrictions on assisted reproduction have the effect of extolling the value of marriage as a
repository for heterosexual intercourse. Limiting forms of assisted reproduction to married
couples, then, cannot be justified as advancing marriage’s role in the regulation of human sexual
relations.

b. Legitimation of Children
Marriage’s value to society has been said to lie in part in its power to legitimate
offspring. Marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy, then, might be understood as a way of
channeling legitimacy of birth. But legitimacy of birth is not achieved by restricting surrogacy to
married couples. In fact, were legitimacy of birth any longer of importance in the regulation of
family relationships, inheritance and other matters, it would be necessary to acknowledge that no
child born of a gestational agreement is legitimate. This is because the law has never recognized
legitimation based on the fact of marriage alone. Legitimation by marital presumption has
always depended upon a child’s being “born to” a marriage, and this, in turn, has required that
the wife perform at least the gestational function of reproduction. Moreover, the marital
presumption of legitimacy is a presumption of paternity, not of maternity. This is not to suggest
that presumptions of paternity do not apply to the establishment of maternity53 but simply that
marriage does nothing to alter the presumption that the woman who gestates a child is the child’s
mother. By way of illustration, if a single woman gives birth to a child by a married man, the

ecclesiastical annulment on the basis of impotence is not available for sterility but simply for an
inability to perform sexual intercourse. See id. at 17.
53
Although rare, cases where a presumption of maternity is raised in favor of a woman with no
biological link to the child do exist. See, e.g., In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App.
2002). The presumption was in no way related, however, to the woman’s marital status.
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man’s wife is not presumed to be the child’s mother, even if the man’s wife contributed her egg
to the arrangement.54
Not only do marital restrictions on surrogacy not promote legitimacy of birth; the very
argument that they are intended to strains credulity. NCCUSL itself originally promulgated the
UPA to end discrimination against nonmarital children, and this laudable objective has been
carried forward in the UPA’s new formulation.55 It would be contradictory to issue a
pronouncement of the inherent dignity of all children regardless of their birth status and
simultaneously to express concern about the legitimacy of children born of surrogacy. Such a
stance would moreover render the UPA internally inconsistent: Article 6 of the UPA permits
alleged fathers to rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy, and Article 7 promotes single
motherhood by denying the paternity of sperm donors. Thus, marriage-based restrictions on
surrogacy are not intended to and moreover could not ensure legitimacy of birth.

c. Two-Parent Support
Perhaps the most instantly appealing justification for marriage-based restrictions on
surrogacy is the strong societal policy which favors charging at least two persons with support
obligations for each child and identifying them at the earliest possible point in time, thus making
it as unlikely as possible that the child will at any time become a public charge.56 Marriage is
without doubt a particularly efficient tool by which to ground two-parent support. When a child
54

See, e.g., Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Doe v. Doe, 710
A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
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See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 2, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001) (“[C]hildren born to parents who are
not married to each other have the same rights . . . as children born to parents who are married to
each other.”).
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is born to a married couple, gestational and marital-presumption parentage are called into play,
and the law requires the couple to support the child. Under this rubric, which applies based on
easily obtainable public facts, there is no point in time when the identity of those responsible for
the support of the child is in doubt.57 Although it does not necessarily follow, this assumption
about marriage brings along with it the view that unmarried couples, by contrast, will be less
likely to provide children with two-parent support. This view applies in particular to unwed
fathers, whose paternity is not always established as a legal matter.
As we have already seen in Part II.C.2.b, supra, marital-presumption parentage applies in
surrogacy cases in ways the parties to gestational agreements wish to circumvent. When a child
is born to a surrogate, the marital presumption points to the surrogate mother and her husband or
the surrogate and the genetic father as the responsible parties. Two-parent support for children
born of surrogacy, then, is not dependent upon restricting surrogacy to married couples. The aim
of surrogacy legislation is not to identify the parties responsible for a child in the first instance
but simply to shift responsibility for the child to other parties by overcoming the traditional
presumptions and decreeing a different set of obligations. It can do so in at least three different
ways: (1) requiring that the intended parents adopt the child after the child’s birth,58 (2)
mandating state approval of surrogacy agreements at the time of their creation and decreeing
their ramifications,59 or (3) issuing pre-birth declarations of parentage.60 Under all three
approaches, two-parent support is achieved through provisions that have nothing to do with
56

Aside from the interest in child support, the two-parent model seems driven by the idea that
each child should have one mother and one father, no more and no less. This basis for justifying
marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy is discussed in Part II.C.2.e infra.
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See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
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See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001).
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marriage and involve judicial intervention not required when a married couple has a child via
traditional means. Under the Uniform Parentage Act’s Article 8 and similar statutory schemes,
for example, the intending parents, whether married or not, must embody their intentions in a
written document and must submit this document to the court for judicial pre-approval.61 If they
fail to do so, they are not relieved of an obligation to support the child. The document is simply
given no effect and traditional parentage rules apply.62 Even if they are not recognized as the
child’s legal parents at its birth, though, the intending parents are still liable for support under the
specific terms of Article 8 if they refuse to adopt the child.63 Also, if the intending parents
decide not to comply with the terms of the agreement at any time that it remains executory after
impregnation of the surrogate, their obligation to support the child isunaffected.

64

In

consequence, even if the intending couple’s intentions toward the child changed, they would not
be relieved of their support obligation. Similar obligation attaches if the marriage of the
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intending parents ends in separation or divorce.65 These provisions suggest that responsibility
may have to be recognized completely apart from parentage, again underscoring the lack of any
useful presumptions in these cases.
This elaborate set of regulations demonstrates the lack of any role for marriage in either
determining or solidifying support obligations for children born of surrogacy. Instead, the rules
of obligation in Article 8 are simply necessary substitutions for support obligations that would
otherwise flow automatically from well established presumptions of parentage, including those
grounded in marriage, that the parties to surrogacy agreements wish to avoid. These rules mirror
what Professor June Carbone has found to be a trend in other areas of family law. Carbone notes
that, more and more, “marital status has been supplanted by financial and emotional maturity as
the indicia of responsible parenthood.”66 Financial and emotional maturity are, of course,
precisely what a court in validating a gestational agreement wants most to ascertain about the
intending parents. Evidence of marital status, though, is neither necessary nor sufficient for
establishing these traits. Since the support provisions of Article 8 and other similar regulations
ensure two-parent support for any child born of a gestational agreement and do not look to
marriage for any reason having to do with ensuring two-parent support, interpretivism supports
the rejection of marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy.

d. Encouragement of Marriage
As a matter of public policy, we value marriage in part because we believe married
couples will discharge a set of responsibilities toward each other and that their doing so will have
many salutary effects on our society. As a consequence, we bestow upon married couples
65

See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(C) (Michie 2000).
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“numerous benefits . . . and protections,”67 with the intention of encouraging people to become
and stay married. The vast majority of these protections and benefits have been associated with
marriage for a very long time and have become firmly established as indelible markers of
marriage’s revered status. Perhaps marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy are drawn with this
policy in mind. If so, these restrictions are in complete accord with established public policy.
While it has been true that marriage has historically been endowed with numerous
privileges and benefits, these benefits have remained relatively fixed through time. It is rare
occurrence that married couples are made the sole beneficiaries of newly created privileges.
Instead, recent legislative initiatives to encourage or benefit marriage have taken one of three
forms: (1) clarifying the definition of marriage at both the federal and the state levels; (2)
lowering barriers to entry, and (3) lowering barriers to exit.
Those advocating for clarification that marriage may only exist between two persons of
opposing genders seek not to benefit married couples alone but to reaffirm heterosexual marriage
as the organizing principle essential to the integrity of society.68 Much of the language
developed by this initiative describes the “natural” or “traditional” family as attainable only
through the marriage of one man with one woman.69 At the same time, any elitist or
exclusionary overtones that might emanate from such a conception of marriage are tempered by
its easy availability. The law demands less mental capacity to marry than is required either to
make a basic will or enter into a simple contract, and even minors, with proper parental or court
approval, are permitted to marry. The court system has been cooperative in this project. In his
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research, Professor Milton Regan has discerned a judicial trend toward applying a more exacting
level of scrutiny against state regulation of marriage than was true forty years ago.70 Barriers to
exit have been dramatically dismantled by the widespread appearance of no-fault divorce
provisions throughout the 1970s. Although the impact of such provisions is the subject of
intense debate,71 some expert commentators firmly believe that no-fault regimes encourage
marriage if only because removing the coercive aspects of marriage helps make it more palatable
to those who would otherwise be hesitant to give it a try. Furthermore, no-fault divorce does not
conflict with policy favoring remarriage.72 Statistics support at the very least the view that the
effect of no-fault divorce provisions on the marriage rate is benign. Despite the rise in the
number of divorces that no-fault provisions has made possible in the last thirty years, there has
been no corresponding plunge in the marriage rate. Indeed, perhaps because of the existence of
no-fault divorce, marriage is at present experiencing an increase in popularity.73
There is good reason to doubt that marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy encourage
marriage. NCCUSL initially included a marriage requirement in its uniform surrogacy
70
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provisions not to encourage marriage but because it had the utmost sympathy for married couples
who, after struggling for years to procreate only to discover they have waited too long to adopt,
turn to surrogacy as a last act of desperation. From this perspective, gestational surrogacy
actually appears to be something that most couples would not want from marriage. Restricting
gestational surrogacy to married couples, then, would have little impact on a couple’s decision to
marry. Although marriage-based surrogacy restrictions provide little encouragement to marry in
the first instance, they perhaps provide an incentive for couples near the end of a long and
painful journey of infertility to stay married so that they may pursue surrogacy. That aim would
certainly comport with the public policy favoring fostering the longevity of intact marriages.
The aim could just as effectively be accomplished, though, in the absence of marriage-based
restrictions on surrogacy. It is quite hard to see, in other words, how the inclusion of unmarried
couples in surrogacy legislation would inspire couples who are already married to divorce before
entering into a surrogacy agreement. As a final possibility, then, marriage- based restrictions
might actually force unmarried couples who have not been able to procreate and now want to
enter a gestational agreement to get married at last. Such a scenario is not impossible to
envision, though it would no doubt arise very seldom. In any event, a marriage entered into for
the sole purpose of executing a gestational agreement is probably not at all what the policy of
encouraging marriage is meant to accomplish. At the very least, such a marriage is not the
“deserving” one NCCUSL was referring to when it initially included marriage-based restrictions
in the 2000 UPA. In the final analysis, then, marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy appear to
have very little or nothing to do with encouraging marriage.

66 (explaining that the belief in a “marriage turnaround” is based on weak and inconclusive
demographic evidence) [hereinafter Blankenhorn, Marriage Problem].
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e. Concerns about Consistency and Neutrality
Interpretivism requires social policy to exhibit consistency and neutrality if it is to
command broad public support. In the context of surrogacy, interpretivism calls marriage-based
restrictions into question both on the basis of their inconsistency with well settled constitutional
principles related to procreative liberty and to the differential treatment of marital and nonmarital children.

i. Restrictions on Access to Reproductive Options
Although it is permissible to limit the procreative freedom of prisoners and
probationers,74 it is simply not consistent with the American constitutional tradition to condition
the procreative rights of others upon their marital status. Even if one could argue that a case like
Skinner v. Oklahoma expresses an essential linkage between marriage and procreative liberty,75
such a reading ultimately falters under the weight of more recent Supreme Court
pronouncements guaranteeing procreative liberty to the married and the unmarried alike. The
marriage-procreation link is also absent from parental-autonomy jurisprudence. Parham v. J.R.,
for example, nowhere suggests a relationship between marriage and the presumption that parents
act in the best interests of their children.76 If the presumption were dependent upon a marital
relationship, Parham would have asserted as much, since the Supreme Court had recognized the
procreative rights of unmarried persons nearly a decade before it decided that case. Unmarried
parents benefit as fully from the presumption as do their married counterparts.
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Without a link between marriage and procreative liberty, what the issue becomes for
surrogacy is whether it falls within the ambit of procreative freedom and thus outside of the
realm of behavior it is permissible to restrict on the basis of marital status. Some courts and
commentators believe that assisted reproduction, including surrogacy, is constitutionally
protected procreation. Perhaps the best known commentator on the constitutional dimensions of
assisted reproduction, Professor John Robertson, has concluded that “collaborative reproduction
[including surrogacy] is an important part of procreative liberty.”77 Some courts hold similar
views on assisted reproduction, at least in part. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example,
has stated that artificial insemination is a constitutionally protected procreative interest. Some
federal courts agree, and at least one has deemed engaging a gestational surrogate an act of
procreative liberty.78 Insofar as equal protection is concerned, a New York court (in In re
Michael) has stated in dicta that it might be a violation of equal protection for a statute to allow
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only married women the right to employ assisted reproduction,79 and NCCUSL has described
one of the aims of its newly revamped Uniform Parentage Act as the “constitutional protection[]
of the procreative rights of unmarried . . . women.”80 Older cases and commentary sometimes
take a different view, suggesting that surrogacy is a far cry from procreative freedom and is,
moreover, unethical. Legislation outlawing surrogacy sends the strong message that it is in
conflict with important social policies and deeply held values.
These various viewpoints on the procreative character of surrogacy at best leave
unresolved the issue of whether surrogacy is included in our understanding of constitutionally
protected procreative activities. They also indicate that surrogacy as a method of having children
is not widely embraced. Given that most jurisdictions have no legislation on surrogacy, and of
the ones that do, most simply outlaw the practice, we realize that our society is at the very least
undecided whether surrogacy is acceptable. If interpretivism were merely concerned with the
scope of constitutionally protected procreative activity and contemporary views on surrogacy, it
would not be offended by outlawing surrogacy altogether or limiting it to married couples. As a
matter of our contemporary values, then, an outright rejection of gestational agreements would
not offend the interpretive approach.
Furthermore, even where surrogacy is condoned, it may be that marriage-based
restrictions–although they do nothing to encourage marriage–are a way of expressing profound
respect for marriage. This sentiment was precisely what drove the inclusion of a marriage-based
restriction on surrogacy in the 2000 version of the UPA. Indeed, the Conference’s express
79
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position in support of the restriction was that married couples entering gestational agreements are
“the most deserving class of persons that would participate in these agreements.”81 Moreover,
legislative initiatives aimed at creating special rights for married couples, albeit rare, are hardly
unknown. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, in spite of its stated policy that
workplace leave should be available in ways that support family integrity, contains a narrow
definition of “immediate family member” that excludes unmarried couples from the ambit of its
protections. Married couples received a sweeping exemption from taxation in 1981 when
Congress supplemented our unified transfer tax system with the unlimited marital deduction.
Even President Bush’s “healthy marriage initiative” could be construed as a measure enshrining
“special rights” for married couples only.82 When Vermont passed its civil union legislation in
2000, it cataloged around thirty ways in which marriage was accorded special status under
Vermont law.83 Marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy may simply be another way our
society elects to express that marriage is valuable, significant, and revered.
As explained above, however, interpretivism is not concerned merely with one set of
contemporary values or constitutional guarantees. Other values, constitutional guarantees and
consistency in the law are equally important. Equal protection, for example, could be raised as a
barrier to permitting only married couples to participate in gestational agreements.84 Even if
surrogacy itself is not widely embraced, equality of treatment certainly is and is arguably
embodied in the general trend, described by Professor Mary Ann Glendon almost thirty years
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ago, that “legal distinctions between the married and the unmarried . . . are being erased.”85
Finally, consistency in the law appears undermined by treating non-sexual forms of reproduction
differently from sexual forms of reproduction.86
The force of these observations is that it is not essential to determine whether surrogacy
is a fundamental right or to worry that surrogacy is not a widely embraced method of
reproduction in order to establish that where a state chooses to endorse surrogacy, it must do so
in a way that does not exclude unmarried couples. This conclusion is not changed by the fact
that our legal system condones discrimination on the basis of marital status unless that
discrimination lacks a rational basis. For social policy to achieve the broad social acceptance
that is the aim of interpretivism, it must aim to satisfy a higher standard than mere rational basis.
In other words, whereas “an uncommonly silly law” might have a rational basis to shield it
against constitutional attack, such a law would not survive under interpretivism’s more exacting
microscope. Even if discrimination on the basis of marital status is certain to survive rational
basis scrutiny in many contexts, society’s commitment to equal treatment and interpretivism’s
commitment to consistency in the law would successfully call into question the integrity of such
an exclusion in the context of surrogacy regulation.

ii. Equal Treatment of Non-Marital Children
A final problem with marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy is their inconsistency with
interpretivism’s commitment to neutrality. As explained above, these restrictions are neither
intended to have nor do they have the effect of promoting legitimacy of birth. Neither do they
play a role in securing child welfare. To the extent thatthese restrictions nonetheless serve a
85
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significant expressive function in creating the illusion of legitimacy of birth, they nonetheless run
afoul of what are now firmly established constitutional and social commitments to equal
treatment. In brief, we agree that the law should be neutral toward a class of persons that is
blam
eless in incurring

unfavorable treatment. To regulate surrogacy so as to permit only the

birth of children who appear to be legitimate undermines neutrality by perpetuating the very
legitimacy/illegitimacy distinction that has been fully discredited at the highest level of our
judiciary.87 Not only would such regulation be inimical to equal treatment but it would also be
an improper use of the law to give public effect to private biases.88 Thus, any purpose of using a
marriage requirement to promote legitimacy of children is out of step with constitutional
principles and contemporary views of children’s rights. It moreover is not in keeping with the
need for neutrality in the formulation of sound social policy.
Exclusion of unmarried couples from entering into surrogacy agreements is unjustified
when examined through the lens of interpretivism. The exclusion does not encourage marriage
or promote the purposes of marriage. Instead, it appears to conflict with important constitutional
tenets opposed to state interference with procreative choices with no corresponding enhancement
of our society’s interest in securing two-parent support for each child. At the same time, the
exclusion undermines significant commitments to consistency and neutrality in the law that are
the hallmarks of sound social policy. Therefore, any state considering regulating gestational
agreements would be well advised not to restrict the ability of unmarried couples to execute such
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agreements.

II. MARRIAGE AND ADOPTION
A. Adoption and Surrogacy: Comparisons and Contrasts
The question of how surrogacy should be regulated invariably invites comparisons
between surrogacy, about which little regulation exists,89 and adoption, which is highly
regulated. Although the question has been debated for over almost twenty years,90 the extent to
which surrogacy should track adoption’s regulatory model is still far from settled.91 Some see
surrogacy and adoption as substantially congruent in their aims and thus adoption as the
appropriate template for surrogacy.92 Others find important and even stark differences between
the two that inspire them to reject situating surrogacy within an adoption framework.93
Differences of opinion on this matter appear to depend upon whether one believes
surrogacy is like adoption because it is not procreative94 or less like adoption because it is.95 In
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exercising their procreative liberty, coital progenitors benefit from a presumption of fitness and
need make no showing of their fitness before exercising the parental prerogatives that stem from
their act of procreation.96 To regulate access to adoption or surrogacy in a particular way, then,
becomes a question of to what extent the state should be permitted to oversee one’s decision to
become a parent.
Surrogacy and adoption are similar in many ways. Both typically originate with
infertility, provide methods for establishing legal parentage outside of the context of biological
relationships,97 and invest one’s intentions to become a parent with legal significance.98 Both
often involve the presence of third parties in the reproductive process and thus raise questions
about the importance of genetic and gestational ties to the determination of parentage. Other
social-policy questions triggered by both adoption and surrogacy are the value of secrecy over
transparency, the commodification of children, and the exploitation of women. Finally, both
surrogacy and adoption trigger deeply ingrained suspicions and fears about mothers who “reject”
their children.99
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There is also much to distinguish surrogacy from adoption.100 The most salient
difference is that adoption begins after a child or fetus already exists; surrogacy, though, is used
to start the reproductive process in the first place.101 Adoption, a child-focused service, requires
parental fitness and the child’s best interests to be shown; surrogacy, an adult-focused service,
requires only a showing of fitness to parent.102 The two are not equally valued by society, given
the nearly overwhelming desire for and bias in favor of genetically-related children.103 Thus, the
possibility of a genetic tie to a child born through assisted reproduction may make that choice
appear more understandable and legitimate in a society that extols consanguineous relationships
and regards non-consanguineous relationships with suspicion if not derision.104
Since adoption is substantially older than is surrogacy, adoption is at present also much
more regulated than is assisted reproduction.105 Although existing surrogacy reveals the definite
influence of adoption law, it is important to note that adoption law typically requires both the
prospective parents’ fitness and the best interests of the child to be assessed before the adoption
becomes final. Existing surrogacy regulation, by contrast, is concerned only with parental
fitness. Post-birth assessments of a child’s best interests do not occur under existing surrogacy
regulation as they do post-placement in adoption. 106
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B. The Role of Marital Status in Adoption Law
Although marriage is not a necessary condition for exercising procreative liberty or for
benefiting from the powerful presumption that coital progenitors are fit parents who will act in
their offspring’s best interests, marital status is an important eligibility criterion for both adoption
and surrogacy. In both contexts, marital status acts, albeit in different ways, both procedurally as
a standing requirement and substantively as a measure of parental fitness. As we saw in Part I,
surrogacy regulation nearly invariably permits only married couples to employ this method of
having a child. Adoption law by and large expresses a preference for married couples. It
generally prohibits unmarried couples from adopting an unrelated child jointly,107 but it does
allow single persons to adopt in the absence of a willing married couple.108 Under the view of
adoption and surrogacy as mere privileges, legislation denying standing on the basis of marital
status is not constitutionally suspect, even though it may not satisfy the more exacting rigors of
interpretivism. Nonetheless, despite our societal commitment to the institution of marriage, the
reason why the privilege of adoption is not in all cases reserved for married couples is that such a
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bright-line rule will fail to serve the interests of children in all cases, no matter the view of some
that institutionalized care is preferable to being raised by unmarried parents.109
Despite the fact that one need not be married to adopt, marriage does impose certain
constraints on how adoption proceeds. For example, the spouse of a married person who wishes
to adopt must join the petition.110 Under step-parent adoption provisions, a parent whose spouse
wishes to adopt her child need not terminate her parental rights.111 Unmarried couples are
considered singles, and, as mentioned above, in most jurisdictions are not permitted to adopt
jointly. In certain jurisdictions, the legally recognized parent of a child may consent to the
adoption of the child by the parent’s nonmarital partner. Known as “[s]econd or co-parent
adoption,”112 such a procedure could be used where the child is biologically related to the parent
but could also be employed to permit the unmarried couple to adopt the same child, albeit not
jointly but in tandem. New laws in some states may outlaw adoptions by cohabiting unmarried
couples altogether, even adoption in tandem; the best interests of children is declared by these
jurisdictions never to lie with unmarried parents.

C. Step-parent and Second-parent Adoption
The special cases of step-parent and second-parent adoption are especially good lenses
through which to examine more closely how marital status functions in adoption. Both step-
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parent and second-parent adoption result in a child’s having at least two legally recognized
parents.113

1. Step-parent Adoption
Step-parent adoption is recognized in all states and permits a parent’s new spouse to
adopt and become a co-parent of the child. It is typically engrafted upon an adoption statute as
an exception to the rule that a child’s former parents’ parental rights must be terminated before
the adoption can be approved. The right of the child to inherit from or through the parent whose
rights are terminated varies from state to state.114
In contrast to the typical adoption trajectory, taking the prospective adoptive couple
through an initial home study, a waiting period, and a post-placement home study before a
hearing is commenced and a final decree issued,115 step-parent adoption provisions streamline
the process in order to give great weight to a parent’s spouse’s petition to adopt the child. Most
significant is that, in contrast to the trend mandating pre- and post-placement home studies in
adoption cases, such evaluations and even waiting periods are routinely waived in step-parent
adoption cases,116 unless the adoption is contested.117 Moreover, the duration of the marriage is
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typically of no significance in step-parent adoption,118 though some states do impose a waivable
requirement that the marriage have endured for at least one year.119
The justification for relaxing or doing away with typical adoption requirements is to take
account of the fact that the petitioner already lives with the child before an adoption petition is
filed.120 In this context, it is said that a pre-placement assessment would not “fit the facts” of the
case.121 Curiously, though, a post-placement study, though it does fit the facts is also not
required.122 Naturally, such lack of evaluation does not free a court from its responsibility for
making a best-interests determination in step-parent adoption cases,123 but, without the objective
evaluations typically required in adoption, the body of evidence available for making such a
determination will understandably be under the control of the petitioners themselves,124 will thus
likely reflect only favorably on them,125 and will typically lack assessments by independent child
welfare professionals.126 Perhaps even more disconcerting is that no one present at the hearing
will be inspired to ask the court to take judicial notice of studies showing that children are at
greater risk of harm at the hands of step-parents than they are from biological parents living
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together or from a biological parent living without a partner.127 The studies may well not
contemplate the class of step-parents who desire to adopt their step-children, but a mere desire to
adopt is insufficient to support a best-interests determination in any adoption context.128
Nonetheless, experts have not hesitated to criticize the relaxation of requirements for step-parent
adoption as contributing to child abuse in the home.129
It could be said that in relaxing the requirements for adoption, the law is merely pursuing
the constitutionally mandated presumption that the parent will act in the best interests of her
child in choosing a new parent for the child. But granting a legal parent such power would
appear anomalous, especially since, under the traditional approach, legal parentage does not exist
in the absence of a genetic, gestational, presumed, or adoptive relationship, and an already
legally recognized parent, no matter the force of the best-interests presumption, has no power to
vest a new parent of her choice with any of these. What this analysis of step-parent adoption
provisions makes clear, then, is that relaxation of the requirements for adoption in this context is
due solely to the fact that the legal parent has remarried. In sharp contrast to the traditional
adoption trajectory, the quality of the marriage, the duration of the marriage, and especially the
quality of the step-parent/step-child relationship are virtually irrelevant to the step-parent
adoption decision.
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2. Second-parent Adoption
Second-parent adoption is a procedure whereby a legally recognized parent’s committed
partner may adopt and become a co-parent of the child. It is statutorily permitted in some
states,130 but more typically is justified by provisions authorizing adoption by “any
individual,”131 liberal construction of step-parent adoption provisions,132 by the clear import of or
by inferences drawn from other express provisions,133 and by consistency with the policy of
adoption law.134 Because step-parent adoption provisions are not directly applicable, then,
second-parent adoption may be unavailable in states where all other types of adoption result in
the termination of parental rights prior to the final decree.135 Where termination is not statutorily
mandated, however, but is merely expressed as the usual consequence of an adoption, the theory
of waiver of statutory rights and benefits permits a court to grant a second-parent adoption with
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no effect on the original parent’s rights.136 In all, second-parent adoption is recognized in
twenty-eight states.137 A handful of other states has concluded that second-parent adoptions are
not authorized under the adoption laws of those states but otherwise declines to express any
opinion about whether such adoptions could serve the best interests of children.138 Several
states, though, have made affirmative strikes against second-parent adoption. Florida explicitly
outlaws adoption by gay and lesbian persons,139 Mississippi bans adoption by same-gender
couples,140 and Utah bans adoption by unmarried cohabiting couples.141 Oklahoma denies full
recognition of adoptions by gay and lesbian couples in other states by restricting adoption to no
more than one person of the same sex.142 Administrative-agency rules in Arkansas and Nebraska
disqualify gays and lesbians from serving as foster parents, effectively preventing them from
adopting children in state care.143
Although analogous to step-parent adoption, second-parent adoption does not require the
parent to be married to the party seeking to adopt the child. Thus, second-parent adoption is in
most jurisdictions the only mechanism an individual can use to adopt his or her partner’s
136
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children. For gay and lesbian couples, who cannot marry in most jurisdictions, second-parent
adoption is the only way to provide children protections they would otherwise achieve through
step-parent adoption. This legal device has been described as consistent with the reality of
children’s lives and calculated to forge the strongest legal bond possible between a child and
those functioning as his parent.144
Commentators opposed to second-parent adoption opine that it is contrary to children’s
best interests,145 beyond the competence of family court judges,146 and even immoral.147 Other
commentators accuse grants of second-parent adoption petitions to be devoid of any serious
inquiry into the best interests of the child, based on an erroneous view of adoption as a
fundamental right, and precursors of “new and bizarre” family structures that will inexorably
lead to judicial recognition of three-, four-, and five-parent families.

D. Parental Fitness and Children’s Interests
From a policy perspective, it is impossible not to discern the wide gulf between
streamlined step-parent adoption cases where a perfunctory if any best-interests inquiry takes
place and blanket prohibitions on second-parent adoption. If nothing more, setting up a
143
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procedural obstacle to adoption deprives the court of making the individualized assessments that
we know the best-interests inquiry contemplates.148 Inevitably, into this gulf fall children who
would benefit from being adopted by a second parent rather than otherwise never having two
legal parents and thus whose best interests could be served by the adoption. This is particularly
poignant in cases of artificial insemination where as a matter of law in many jurisdictions and as
a practical matter in others a child has only one legal parent.149 An argument for harmonizing
the law of step-parent and second-parent adoption follows.

1. Streamlining: Parental Fitness by Proxy
Emerging from the sketch of how step-parent adoption works is the sense that marriage
alone acts as a virtual proxy for or at the very least a presumption in favor of a child’s best
interests. Marriage embodies the notion of the permanent, loving home that every child
deserves. By contrast, the absence of marriage carries with it no such notion/and at worst that
the child will suffer untold indignities that will be visited on society at large. This role for
marriage is certainly not unknown in other areas of family law and could be explained as
consistent with our existing legal tradition in two different ways. First, a parent’s marriage to
someone who is not also the parent of her child could be said to raise a presumption of parentage
similar to marital-presumption parentage. This presumption, in turn, raises the presumption that
the presumed parent acts in the best interests of his child. The court can then take notice of this
presumption and grant the adoption in the absence of any evidence that would undermine the
presumption. This explanation of the existence of streamlining in step-parent adoption is
147
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admittedly convoluted and forced. More convincing as an explanation might simply be that the
presumption that legal parents act in the best interests of their children validates the legal
parent’s choice of another parent for her child as in that child’s best interests in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Both approaches suggest that as long as there is marriage, very little in
the way of further inquiry is needed to validate the adoption.
Given that neither of the presumptions just described has ever functioned in this way in
family law, neither of the foregoing explanations justifies streamlining in step-parent adoption.
First, marital-presumption parentage requires that the child be born to the marriage so as to lend
credence to what it supposes about procreative facts; in the step-parent adoption context, then,
the most basic premise behind marital-presumption parentage is absent. If marital-presumption
parentage cannot be made to fit a possibly procreative context like surrogacy,150 it certainly
cannot be made to fit adoption, which wholly lacks any procreative aspect. Second, the
presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of her child is not a presumption that
establishes parentage but one that arises from an already recognized parent-child relationship.
The presumption is inoperative where no genetic tie or already decreed adoption exists. Thus,
the presumption has no application to a pending adoption matter.
Just as a marriage requirement in the context of surrogacy fails to serve any justifiable
purpose or raise any presumptions that we associate with marriage, streamlining on the basis of
marriage in step–parent adoption cases is similarly unprincipled because it as well has no basis in
familiar parentage presumptions and does not comport with the need to evaluate rigorously the
best interests of the child in every adoption case.
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2. Making Children Unadoptable: In Whose Interest?
In contrast to streamlining of the procedures undertaken in step-parent adoption cases,
where inquiry into the best interest of the child is perfunctory at best, second-parent adoption,
where permitted, requires the full range of evaluations of the adopted child’s best interests to
take place. This approach seems consistent with focusing on the interests of children in adoption
cases instead of on the relationship or interests of the prospective parents151 and is, moreover,
consistent with the methods that have traditionally been used to achieve those interests. Where
second-parent adoption is not permitted, only by marrying her domestic partner may an
individual be deemed fit to adopt and become a co-parent of the domestic partner’s child. As we
have already seen, however, marriage is not a suitable proxy for parental fitness or for children’s
best interests. As we will see below, second-parent adoption is the only way some children can
ever hope to have two legally recognized parents. The refusal to allow second-parent adoption,
or even to make it a more burdensome procedure than step-parent adoption, then, seems more
geared toward granting privileges to married couples than toward ensuring the best interests of
children.
Contrary to the criticisms of second-parent adoption, an examination of second-parent
adoption cases reveals the courts’ painstaking and probing examination of the circumstances of
the individual children in each and every case in search of the decision that will most promote
the best interests of the child. Despite the clear analogy to step-parent adoption procedures,152
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there is never any waiver of home studies or waiting periods of the sort we see in that context.
Even where the law provides a mechanism whereby a second-parent adoption petitioner may
apply for a waiver, invariably such requests must be supported by “numerous affidavits and
letters attesting to the longevity and strength of the relationship between the prospective adopters
and legal memoranda in support of such a waiver . . . .”153 By contrast, a step-parent’s request
for a waiver is almost always routinely granted with no supporting documentation.154 Moreover,
the evaluations required often include a costly bonding assessment by a licensed psychologist in
addition to the significantly less expensive home study by a social worker. Invariably, courts
hearing these petitions focus on the financial benefits that will accrue to the child, including
support, inheritance rights, Social Security benefits and health insurance155 and on the emotional
benefits a child reaps from adoption.156 But beyond this, the courts recognize that these
adoptions differ significantly from stranger adoptions. A child is not being “reborn” into a new
family where all ties to his prior family are erased. Instead, “the children’s existing familial
bonds” are respected and given legal recognition.157 Nothing about how the child experiences
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love, care, and commitment changes after these adoptions except for the greater assurance of
continuity of love, care and commitment that accompanies an adoption decree.158 The effort is
plainly to afford the children involved the greatest legal protections in the most permanent,
stable, supportive, and nurturing home these children can hope to have.159
None of these cases proceeds along the lines of vindicating the petitioner’s “right” to
adopt the child.160 Completely absent from these decisions is any sense that the marital status of
these committed couples is in any way contrary to the best interests of the children, or that it
renders the petitioners unfit to be parents. On the other hand, in contrast to the step-parent cases,
where the marriage itself appears to establish a right to adopt the child, courts in second-parent
cases remain open to hearing evidence that living in the home of a same-sex couple will harm the
children, and they seek to balance whatever “negative effects” might be present with the benefits
to be acquired.161 Such a painstaking balancing of the factors is utterly absent from step-parent
cases, where the fact of marriage alone renders the otherwise mandatory best-interests inquiry
superfluous.
Critics of second-parent adoption are more concerned with finding new ways to bolster
the privileged position of married couples in society than they are with promoting the best
interests of each and every child according to his or her personal circumstances. Brigham Young
family law professor Lynn Wardle, for example, was among those who testified in favor of
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Utah’s adoption ban. At the time, Wardle described having been troubled that a number of Utah
judges were sympathetic to gay and lesbian couples who sought legal recognition of the parentand-child relationships within their families.162 The resulting law definitively pronounces that it
is never in the best interest of any child to have unmarried parents. This pronouncement
effectively serves as a standing requirement preventing a cohabitant from petitioning to adopt a
child as a second parent. The requirement preempts a fact-based inquiry into the best interests of
the child in question.
More recently, Wardle has claimed the ban is justified because at any given time in Utah
there are enough married couples petitioning to adopt all of Utah’s adoptable children.163
Wardle neglects to mention that second-parent adoption petitions are never brought for the
adoption of children in state custody. Rather, second-parent adoption petitions are brought by
individuals who seek to adopt and become a co-parent of a domestic partner’s child. What
Wardle would like to overlook is that the children who are the subject of second-parent adoption
petitions are extremely unlikely ever to be available for adoption by a married couple. Most of
these cases involve artificial insemination using donor sperm of women who with their partners
planned and prepared for the conception, birth and rearing of this child.164 In all of these cases,
both women have reared the children since birth, and so it is unsurprising that the children have
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bonded with and consider both of them to be their parents.165 Even more than in step-parent
cases, where the step-parent more than likely has not been committed to or reared the child since
his or her birth, the adoptions in second-parent adoption cases seem tailor-made to promote the
child’s best interests.166
In the academic literature, Wardle has assumed a different stance toward second-parent
adoption than he did when he testified before the Utah Legislature. Writing on the “least
detrimental alternative” approach to adoption in the 1997 edition of the Illinois Law Review,
Wardle conceded that certain “less-than-perfect . . . adoption arrangements are the best options
for a particular child,” even if those arrangements are “exceptional cases” involving “less-thanideal parents.”167 Unfortunately, Wardle did not bring his scholarly opinion to the attention of
the Utah Legislature in 2000 when he lobbied against permitting adoption even in such
exceptional cases. The result of his legislative advocacy is that Utah courts are no longer
permitted to consider even the least detrimental alternative in second-parent adoption cases,
since an unmarried cohabitant can no longer achieve standing to bring an adoption petition in the
first instance. Second-parent adoptions are altogether prohibited.
Restrictions on standing to petition to adopt, under any microscope, seem extraordinary,
especially given that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in any adoption.168
Courts agree with the professor in Wardle that the possibility that a “least detrimental
alternative” exists in any given case means that standing to petition to adopt should be liberal in
165
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scope to permit courts to assess “the potential [of the applicant] to successfully parent a child in
foster care or adoption.”169 Even the Utah Supreme Court has embraced the least-detrimentalalternative ethic by stating that the issue in every adoption should be
whether children who are subject to adoption have a right to have as adoptive parents
those who may be the only people who can give the children the reasonable nurture, care,
guidance, and love as a foundation for realizing their highest potential as human
beings.170
Although recognizing the prerogative of the legislature “to determine how the most basic social
unit in society should be organized,” 171 the court nonetheless described adoption as “the kind of
case in which a trial judge should not be bound by . . . rigid standards.”172 In short, the court
recognized that the best interests inquiry is “fact-specific”--one focusing on whether “the
interests of these children will [] be promoted by permitting their adoption by these
petitioners.”173 As such, “a blanket exclusion” of an entire of class of persons from standing is
simply bad public policy.174
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Since legal protection of child welfare was not Professor Wardle primary concern when
he advocated for adoption reform in Utah, he presumably also supports Oklahoma’s new policy
of nullifying the legal tie between a child and a gay or lesbian parent who has adopted the child
in another state.
Were critics like Wardle at all concerned about child welfare, they would devote their
energy to promoting two-parent support for every child rather than fomenting disapproval of gay
and lesbian couples and diminished legal protections for their children. Even if Wardle’s
legislative priorities were congruent with his academic ones, he has demonstrated that in the final
analysis he favors depriving certain children of the chance to have two legally recognized parents
if doing so adds luster to the meaning of marriage. As we will see below, Wardle’s views in this
regard are consistent with those of others within what has become known as “the marriage
movement.”

III. THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT
The American marriage movement is a loose amalgam of initiatives reacting to the
decline of the heterosexual, marital nuclear family,175 defined as a heterosexual married couple
raising the children born to the two of them in one household. The movement views
heterosexual marriage as central to societal integrity and aims to identify and dismantle or deflect
any forces that threaten its primacy. To accomplish this aim, the movement pursues two
objectives: (1) strengthening the status of heterosexual marriage in the formulation of social
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policy; and (2) assisting individual heterosexual couples in contracting enduring and satisfying
marriages.176 In general, the movement targets any family system, legal mechanism, or social
force that undermines or stands as an alternative to heterosexual marriage. Specific targets
consist largely of manifestations of “individualism”: no-fault divorce, same-sex marriage,
unmarried and single parenthood, and stepparent families.177
This Part offers a close reading of the literature of the marriage movement and argues
that the claims of the movement, presented as broad, encompassing, and up-to-date, are in
actuality much narrower and more retrograde than they are made to appear. First, the
movement’s articulation of the important public role of marriage—the glue which holds the
whole of society together—is based on functions that no longer have currency in contemporary
postindustrial society. Second, the form of marriage the movement seeks to reinvigorate has
been deemed violative of the equality principles of a civilized society. Perhaps most surprising
is the movement’s position on children. Like Professor Wardle’s stand on second-parent
adoption, children’s welfare, although figuring prominently in the marriage movement’s
176
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literature, turns out at best to be of secondary concern and at worst to be antithetical to the
movement’s primary objective of elevating the position of married couples by any means
available.

A. Historical Antecedents of the Marriage Movement
From a historical perspective, there has perhaps always been a marriage movement.
Marriage has played an important role in the development of both Western and Eastern
civilization, although it has taken on different forms and functions throughout history. The
ancient Egyptians and Israelites revered marriage as did the ancient Greeks and Romans. In
American history, heterosexual marriage has been extolled as “‘the foundation of the family,’”178
as essential to the advancement of civilization,179 to democracy,180 to the propagation of
humanity,181 and to economic prosperity.182 Not surprisingly, the law has for a long time favored
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and continues to favor the institution of marriage. In order to promote marriage,183 the law
provides easy access to marriage by opposite-sex couples,184 fosters harmony within existing
marriages,185 and, when marriages end in divorce, encourages the parties to remarry.186 These
same ideas, along with the message that marriage is divinely sanctioned,187 are also present in
religious perspectives on marriage.188

B. The Work of the Marriage Movement
The contemporary American marriage movement’s primary appeal to history is the view
that marriage has been revered by every society and has played a critical role in the development
of civilization. Instead of focusing and elaborating on the meaning of marriage throughout
history, however, the movement devotes its energy to championing the marital American family
of the early to mid-1960s and expresses concern about contemporary trends away from that
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model.189 The marriage problem we face today, in short, is that, since the early 1960s, American
society has undergone an alarming shift from “familism” to “individualism,”190 and the price of
this has been the decline of marriage.
The early work of the contemporary marriage movement was in reaction to the “divorce
culture” of the United States. The divorce culture was a product of the increasing individualism
in American society and was embraced optimistically as an antidote to unhappiness.191 The
marriage movement published research on the detrimental effects of divorce on individuals and
society (even stepfamilies and remarriage were said to be detrimental) and lobbied for more
restrictive divorce laws, covenant marriage, and preferential welfare regulation for the married
poor.192 In particular, the movement has pointed to feminism and two-career couples as having
injurious effects on marriage and the family.193 More recently, the movement has expressed
concern over cohabitation and single parenthood, said to be among the deleterious fallout of the
divorce culture. Undergirding all of the marriage movement’s initiatives is the call “to create
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and lead a marriage movement that spans the world.” 194
The claims of the marriage movement that are of particular relevance to the current
discussion are (1) that marriage is the building block of society, (2) that marriage contributes to
the well being of children and (3) marriage is currently in crisis. Each of these will be examined
in turn.
1. Marriage Is the Building Block of Society
Building upon the historical evidence that marriage has played an central role in the
organization of society going back millennia195 and upon the conviction that marriage has been
essential to the trajectory of civilization196 and continues to ensure the integrity of society,197 a
basic tenet of the marriage movement is that marriage is not simply a personal choice grounded
in the right to privacy but is an important social good.198 The individual goods that accrue in
larger measure to heterosexual married couples than to unmarried persons—primarily physical
and mental health, physical security, sexual satisfaction, and wealth—ensure a healthy, happy

194

See David Blankenhorn, Should Public Policy Favor Marriage and Children?, THE FAMILY
IN AMERICA, Sept. 2000, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Blankenhorn, Public Policy]; see also COUNCIL ON
FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 3 (1995) (calling for
rebuilding “a family culture based on enduring marital relationships”) [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA].
195
See Blankenhorn, Public Policy, supra note 194, at 6; INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6, 18
(2002) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE].
196
See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 194, at 4 (describing marriage as “the institution
which most effectively teaches the civic virtues of honesty, loyalty, trust, self-sacrifice, personal
responsibility, and respect for others . . . .”).
197
See Carl Hulse, Senate Hears Testimony on a Gay Marriage Amendment, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
2004, at A22 (“[M]arriage is a key social institution.”) (reporting testimony of Federal Marriage
Amendment proponents).
198
INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6, 18 (2002) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE].
54

citizenry.199 But more than this, marriage generates “social capital”--inter-family and
intergenerational bonds that embed married couples and their children within larger social
networks and direct their efforts to the good of all.200 By contrast, the unmarried lack the
significant family support that would devolve to them from their combined kinship groups acting
on the coded obligations that “being married” triggers.201 In sum, marriage “has a [beneficially]
transformative effect on [the] attitudes and behavior” of society as a whole, so much so that
some marriage-movement commentators have dubbed marriage a “seedbed[] of American
democracy.”202
Since societal integrity depends on marriage, threats to marriage create the risk of
society’s downfall.203 On a small scale, contemporary divorce culture makes unmarried and
married people alike unhappy, lonely, and increasingly suspicious of any form of
commitment.204 But on a larger scale, divorce, nonmarital births, the absence of fathers, and the
deinstitutionalization of marriage–called collectively “family disruption”–exacerbate world
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hunger, overpopulation, destruction of the environment, and AIDS.205 Some believe that this
disruption results from forces such as individualism, modernization and globalization.206 Given
the importance of marriage as the building block of society, all marriage-movement
commentators call on the government to promote marriage.207
2. Marriage Contributes to the Well Being of Children
Since marriage is essential to societal integrity, it naturally has an important public
function from which all of society, including children as a class, benefit. But marriage also plays
an important private role in the lives of individual children. For over a decade, the marriage
movement has asserted that the quality of life of American children grows worse each year.208
This is said to be due to the devaluation of children and child rearing resulting from our
divestment from marriage.209 According to the marriage movement, the intact, biological
married family is the setting in which individual children do best. Children raised in step-parent,
single-parent, adoptive, or gay or lesbian households do not fare nearly as well. In the adoption
context, the movement urges restriction to adoption to married couples but does not oppose
adoption by single persons. The movement does, however, oppose the trend toward open
adoption in domestic placements. To the extent the movement acknowledges the blended
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families that result from divorce, it believes “[c]hildren who live with a parent and stepparent do
not fare much better than children who live with a single parent.”210 For this reason, the
movement approves of married stepparent adoptions, since they provide even greater certainty
for the child than does the mere remarriage of his parent. The movement does not, however,
approve of second-parent adoptions by same-sex partners.
All of these positions are subsumed in the movement’s goal to reinscribe marriage “as the unique
repository of sexual life and procreation”211 and its advocacy for social policies that promote
childbearing and child rearing within a marital, nuclear-family structure.
The deleterious effects of divorce on children are of particular concern to the marriage
movement.212 In general, children of divorce have a tendency to disbelieve in the permanency of
relationships; they consequently experience varying degrees of insecurity in their lives, including
an inability to make meaningful connection with other human beings.213 Not only does divorce
harm children, but so does being raised by cohabiting, same-sex, or single parents. Like children
of divorce, such children experience disadvantages that haunt them well into their adult lives.
These disadvantages lead such children to make anti-marriage choices that then send damaging
ripple effects into society for generations to come.
In an effort to disseminate widely the message that marriage benefits children and nonmarriage, the Institute for American Values published Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-One
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Conclusions from the Social Sciences.214 Why Marriage Matters discusses social-science studies
of the effects of family disruption and how the conclusions we can draw from those studies
suggest the need for a renewed commitment to marriage. Why Marriage Matters laments that
children who grow up with unmarried parents increases the likelihood that those children will
have no relationship with their fathers and that, later in life, they will themselves divorce or
become unwed parents.215 These children are more likely than children with married parents to
experience poverty, to achieve less educationally and professionally, and to suffer substance
abuse.216 They are less physically and emotionally healthy217 and are more likely to commit
criminal acts and commit suicide.218
Since heterosexual marriage is the institution “most likely to meet children’s needs and
safeguard their interests,”219 the marriage movement advocates revitalizing this battered
institution in a form in which the interests of children come first.220
3. Marriage Is Currently in Crisis
For all the good that marriage brings to society and to children, it nonetheless is, says the
marriage movement, currently suffering a crisis that threatens to destroy our way of life. The
root of the crisis is that marriage is no longer perceived as a union based on self-sacrifice and
duty, but simply one meant to last only so long as each member of the married couple
experiences personal satisfaction. In other words, marriage has lost its reputation as serving an
important public function and has become just another way of pursuing private ends. Against
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this backdrop of marital crisis, the marriage movement remains committed to the goal of helping
more marriages succeed.221

C. The Literature of the Marriage Movement
1. The Mainstream Press
The most well known texts in the marriage movement are of course intended for a wide
audience and written by authors who choose a conversational, journalistic writing style for ease
of reading. Both social historian Barbara Dafoe Whitehead’s and journalist Maggie Gallagher’s
writings on marriage possess this appeal. Whitehead’s essay Dan Quayle Was Right, published
in the April 1993 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, placed her in the national spotlight. She later
expanded the ideas contained in the essay into the book The Divorce Culture. Gallagher isbest
known for her provocative, early marriage-movement book Enemies of Eros and for her more
recent collaborative effort The Case for Marriage.
In Dan Quayle Was Right, Whitehead focuses squarely on the detrimental effects of
familial disruption on children and society. She concludes it is good for children to grow up in
intact families where they live with both of their married biological parents and not as good if
they grow up in disrupted families. She premises her conclusion on the difference between
“intact” and “disrupted” families. Familial disruption encompasses the full range of
circumstances under which a child is not raised by his or her married biological parents. It
includes not only the disintegration of a child’s biological parents’ marriage through separation
or divorce, but also the fact of a child’s being born out of wedlock. A child born to an unmarried
committed couple also suffers disruption because of the risk that the cohabiting couple will break
220
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up. A child living in a stepparent family is a victim of familial disruption for the same reason.
Even a single woman and the child she intentionally plans and prepares to have and to raise by
herself are an example of a disrupted family, not so much because the child lacks an identifiable
father, but because the child “must come to terms with [the mother’s] love life and romantic
partners.”222 Whitehead equivocates on whether adopted children are victims of disruption, but
the emphasis in her discussion on the value of the biological tie suggests that adopted children,
too, are victims of familial disruption. With the incidence of familial disruption on the rise,
concludes Whitehead, too many children are growing up in circumstances that are not as good
for them as growing up with their married biological parents.223
It is understandable that Whitehead’s article created the stir it did when it was published
over ten years ago and that it continues to be cited in discussions of the marriage problem,
particularly the “dilemma” of single motherhood. A similar chord was struck by Maggie
Gallagher’s Enemies of Eros five years earlier. Through essays with titles such as Baby Lust,
Mother Love; The Murder of Marriage; and Sex Acts Phil Donahue Never Taught You,
Gallagher, a journalist, amazed readers with her sustained diatribe against the destabilizing
effects of no-fault divorce and other ramifications of the rampant individualism that had
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overtaken America.224 Punctuated by tragic stories of people whose lives have been forever
damaged by these social phenomena, Enemies of Eros, highly acclaimed upon its publication,
continues to be a wake-up call for a society hobbled by its own lack of respect for the public role
of marriage.
2. Religious and Academic Perspectives
The marriage movement is not merely advanced by the mass-media contributions
described above. Able legal and social-science scholars have also contributed to the discussion.
I group the academic and theosophist contributions to the marriage movement literature because
of the large overlap between the two. In general, academic writing within the marriage
movement is informed by a Christian-based approach to morality225 and is reflected in the
longstanding collaboration between the Religion, Culture and the Family Project at the
University of Chicago Divinity School and the National Marriage Project of Rutgers University.
Professor Wardle, discussed above in Part II, is the leading legal academic figure in the
marriage movement. He believes the legal academy has erected a taboo against any public
defense of heterosexuals-only marriage,226 and he hopes to enrich the resulting impoverished
academic discourse by arguing not only that the Constitution guarantees no right to same-sex
marriage227 but that legal recognition of same-sex marriage necessarily requires legal protection
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for socially objectionable practices such as polygamy, bigamy, and incest.228 In addition to
fashioning legal arguments against same-sex marriage, Wardle also makes philosophical ones.
He asserts, for example, that the essence of marriage is the blending of opposing sexual
identities, something same-sex marriage cannot achieve.229
Those in agreement with Wardle have articulated similar arguments about the scope of
the Constitution230 and the soundness of a heterosexuals-only definition of marriage.231 But
Professors Collett and Wilkins see the essence of marriage slightly differently than does Wardle.
Although Collett agrees with Wardle that the importance of marriage is that it is a “union of
sexual difference,” she also emphasizes its potential to create new human life and in this way
focuses more squarely on heterosexual sexual intercourse than does Wardle.232 Wilkins focuses
solely on the sexual act: the fundamental importance of heterosexual marriage is the
reproductive look of heterosexual copulation, no matter the sterility of the participants or the
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contraception employed in the act.233 To Wilkins, a husband’s phallic penetration of his wife’s
vagina is a potent symbol that transcends the actual fertility of individual married couples and
channels and promotes responsible procreative behavior on a societal level.234 Indeed, because
of its reproductive appearance, heterosexual coitus is the only sexual act by which two persons
become one flesh.235 Both Collett and Wilkins emphasize that the sexual act must have
reproductive potential, even if the participants are infertile,236 but they disagree on whether the
choice to be infertile through contraception vitiates the purpose of marriage.237 Professor Robert
George states that the act must be “reproductive in type.”238 No matter their disagreement on the
status of different coital acts, these scholars believe the march of civilization has depended upon
the enshrinement of this powerful symbol in the institution of marriage. In their view, to open up
the institution of marriage to participants who lack the capacity to engage in heterosexual coitus
would threaten the very disintegration of civilization.
Social science perspectives round out the academic work of the marriage movement. The
most prominent social scientist in the movement is undoubtedly Professor Linda J. Waite, a
sociologist at the University of Chicago and co-author, with Maggie Gallagher, of The Case for
Marriage. Although not an academic monograph (Harvard University Press withdrew from the
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project upon reviewing the manuscript),239 The Case for Marriage has been defended by Waite
herself as similar in scholarly value to her other academic work.240 The book draws on a decade
of research and begins with the premise that Americans have developed an ambivalence towards
marriage, at once aspiring to it as an important, even sacred, step on the road to happiness and
fulfillment but simultaneously suspecting it to be an arrangement in which the participants must
abandon their cherished personal freedom.241 Generating the ambivalence are legal and
demographic forces. First, in developed nations, the agrarian economy of the pre-industrial age
has given way to a postindustrial economy where marriage is less critical to human survival.242
Second, no-fault divorce has rendered marriage nothing more than any other unilaterally
terminable “adult affair.”243 In short, marriage has become privatized, just one of many options
for arranging intimate relationships.
The result of these developments, according to Waite, is that marriage has lost its public
function of channeling people into new units of production in which they commit to creating
goods for themselves, their children, and the rest of society. In return, society agrees to
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recognize, respect, and benefit the unit.244 The acknowledgment and support of this public role
is critical to triggering marriage’s “unique power” to provide a better society for everyone.245
Whereas marriage has an important public function that must be reaffirmed, The Case for
Marriage asserts that cohabitation does not. As an arrangement easy to put on and then cast off,
cohabitation lacks the type of permanent commitment we associate with marriage. It is
understandably appealing to those who desire above all to maintain their independence and not
relinquish any personal freedom by bearing responsibility for another. Without the “deeper
partnership” of marriage, though, cohabitation neither promises nor offers the many private
goods that marriage does.246
The bulk of The Case for Marriage, like Why Marriage Matters,247 is devoted to
describing these many private goods. Not only does the married couple benefit (better health,
sex, and money), but so do their children (better health, education, and better prospects for
happiness and prosperity going into adulthood). The reader is then left to link these goods with
the social goods described earlier. On the topic of same-sex marriage, The Case for Marriage
takes no explicit stand; the authors themselves cannot agree on its importance.248 The strong
implication made by the book, however, aligns well with Whitehead’s view that children do best
when raised in one household by their married biological parents. As such, the book is most
forcefully aimed at strengthening societal commitment to opposite-sex marriage,249 and so,
unsurprisingly, no agenda for legislating same-sex marriage is included in the authors’ talking
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points for “Renewing Marriage.”250 The Case for Marriage, then, provides no support for samesex marriage and offers many of the arguments against it made by other marriage-movement
commentators.
D. Interpretive Problems of the Marriage Movement
The literature of the marriage movement conveys strong messages about the good of
marriage, the danger to a society not adequately committed to marriage, and the need to
recommit to the idea of marriage. Although couched in broad, encompassing language, and
bolstered by appeals to the important role marriage has played throughout history, these claims
are in fact much narrower than they appear, contain notions antithetical to the ethic of equality
upon which our society is based, and use concerns about child welfare as a makeweight to
support pleas for special benefits for married couples.
1. Narrow Claims
One of the problems with Whitehead’s analysis is that her definition of disruption is
overinclusive. For Whitehead, marriage between a child’s biological parents is itself the
measure of “intactness” of families. Other families are “disrupted” in some way, and, if not
exactly doomed to lives of poverty and misery, are at least worse off than intact families. But to
describe a family headed by an unmarried committed couple as already disrupted because the
couple is more likely to split up than is a married couple makes little sense. Similarly, if as
Whitehead claims, the tragedy of familial disruption is a child suffering the loss of a parent, it is
unclear how the woman who plans and prepares to give birth to a child and to raise the child
alone warrants characterization as disrupted or broken apart. If families that are likely to self249
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destruct are “disrupted,” then so are married couples who as a class, according to Whitehead, are
as likely to divorce as not. Applied consistently, Whitehead’s amorphous definition of
disruption swallows the category of intactness she sets out to defend.
Although “intact” families are those that are best for children, it turns out that only “well
functioning” intact families can truly meet children’s needs. Indeed, in her recent testimony
before a Congressional subcommittee discussing plans to bankroll marriage initiatives that would
make the poor less dependent upon public subsidies, Whitehead praised low-conflict, longlasting marriages, stating that it was these marriages in particular that benefit adults, children,
and society. The categorical association of marriage with intactness, so prominent in Dan
Quayle Was Right, was utterly missing. With this new objective in mind, Whitehead urged
Congress to strive to “reduce the barriers to healthy marriage.” But beyond referring several
times to how divorce harms children, she failed to suggest what barriers to good marriages
Congress should help dismantleor how the proposed legislation would accomplish the task . As
a practical matter, Congress has little control over how easy it is to obtain a divorce, since
divorce provisions are largely a matter of state, not federal, law. Furthermore, the subcommittee
that solicited her testimony was considering legislation not so much aimed at saving already
contracted marriages but in promoting marriage among the not yet married.
Finally, Whitehead and other marriage movement commentators give us no reason to
believe that we are plagued not by a marriage problem but by a divorce problem. Too much
divorce does suggest that many heterosexual marriages are not the well functioning ones that
benefit society. Moreover, experts have made a convincing case that divorce affects children in
insidious and devastating ways well into their adult lives. But concern about divorce does not
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translate into the broad theory of family disruption Whitehead posits. Many couples do not
marry but do the hard work of maintaining a household and raising children. They are as
connected to expansive family and social networks as are many married couples and in some
cases are more so. Like married couples whose marriage functions well, these are not the
couples who are contributing to a divorce culture that harms society. Indeed, divorce may be a
symptom of a marital family that never was intact to begin with. Nonetheless, within
Whitehead’s rubric, well functioning unmarried couples are disrupted, while even the most
dysfunctional married couple is intact. The flaws in Whitehead’s reasoning are themselves
symptoms of the movement’s attempts to breathe new life into its cause by expanding the scope
of the discussion from “the divorce problem” to “the marriage problem.” But the shift in scope
has brought with it many inconsistencies and contradictions. Not surprisingly, then, the marriage
movement has been largely unsuccessful in expanding its claims beyond its initial claim that the
wide availability of no-fault divorce in this country has placed marriage (and by extension
society) in crisis.251
Distilled to its essence, Whitehead’s thesis is difficult to assail: divorce is a symptom of
marital breakdown, and children do best when their parents have a well functioning relationship.
While these ideas are simple and true, they are nonetheless much too narrow to support the grand
claims about marriage Whitehead and other marriage-movement commentators have been
making for well over a decade.
2. Equality Concerns
In addition to adopting narrow premises in its attempt to support broad, encompassing

251

See, e.g., WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 199, at 76-85 (explaining the marriage crisis as a
product of the divorce culture).
68

assertions, the marriage movement betrays an unsettling commitment to a form of marriage
marked by inequality. While expressly rejecting the inequality model of marriage at every turn,
the movement continues to champion the ability of marriage to contribute to economic
prosperity. The contradiction here lies in the fact that the form of marriage which contributes
most to economic prosperity is laden with rigidly balkanized gender roles long decried from the
highest levels of our judiciary as in conflict with our most cherished constitutional guarantees.
Social historian John Demos’s account of marriage suggests that the ability of marriage
to contribute to economic solidity lay in its strictly defined roles for men and women. Building
block idea is Women within this framework provided the sustenance, shelter, and sexual outlets
men needed to restore themselves for renewed forays into the marketplace. These ideas recall
the marriage movement’s insistence that marriage is the building block of society, a notion
probably linked to the important organizing and subsistence functions that marriage formerly
fulfilled but which have fallen away in our age.252 This historical form of marriage has been
described as a tool for the political and economic subjugation of women, an oppression of long
duration in which the law continues to be complicit.253 In particular, Professor Martha Fineman
has developed an intricate and compelling theory positing that within rhetoric about the
importance of marriage to society lies the privatization of dependency on a grand scale.254
According to this theory, this rhetoric masks the traditional nuclear family’s true function in
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serving as a locus for inevitable and derivative dependency.255 With the onslaught of marital
breakdown, Fineman urges that marriage is no longer capable of fulfilling this role and advocates
its abolition as a legal category.256 To replace marriage, Fineman advocates a re-envisioned
family focusing on the mother-and-child caretaking relationship as the core unit of family
intimacy.257
The marriage movement purports to reject the inequality model of marriage so vividly
explicated by Demos and Fineman and to refashion it into an equal partnership where both
spouses bear responsibility for breadwinning, housekeeping and child rearing. Such shared roles
of course create an increased demand for third-party childcare, which commentators in the
marriage movement criticize as detrimental to children.258 While creating more financial wealth
for individual couples, these shared roles also create inflationary pressure, which can lead to
more time spent working and less time in the home. Faced with this inconsistency, other
marriage-movement commentators make clear that the equal-partners-in-marriage model is not a
desirable way to place marriage back on solid footing, or at least should not be an overriding
concern. One view posits that a culture committed to children cannot be fixated on equality and
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autonomy but upon dependence and obligation.259 Another view posits that role sharing in
marriage is too dangerously “androgynous”260 and robs of a marriage of the opposing forces that
generate the sexual desire so essential to conjugal fidelity. The debate continues. No consensus
has yet emerged from the marriage movement as to how, in reinvigorating marriage, we can
avoid resurrecting long-rejected gender-based inequities.
The marriage movement recognizes its dilemma: the goals it claims marriage achieves
cannot be satisfied without returning to anachronistic roles in marriage, but extolling such
marriages would cause the movement to lose coveted political ground. For the time being, the
movement is forced to proclaim its commitment to equality in marriage in the vaguest of terms,
without acknowledging that such a commitment contradicts many of its most adamantly held
positions.
3. Inadequate Concern for Child Welfare
Much of the marriage movement’s efforts to promote marriage is actually detrimental to
children. In Focus on the Family’s latest effort in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment
to outlaw same-sex marriage, a forlorn young boy stares out from a newspaper advertisement
and asks, “Why don’t [certain senators] believe every child needs a mother and a father?” A
warning follows: “Homosexual marriage intentionally creates fatherless families or motherless
families. Think about it.” The advertisement is but one example of how the marriage movement
uses images of suffering children in its quest to engrave a heterosexual definition of marriage on
the Constitution. The advertisement tells readers that not supporting the Marriage Amendment
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will deprive children of a mother and a father. But in the telling, the advertisement misassociates
marriage with parenthood in a rhetorical tactic that has become the trademark of the
heterosexuals-only marriage movement.
Little of substance lies behind the appeals to children’s welfare in the campaign to outlaw
same-sex marriage. At its website, Focus on the Family warns readers that same- sex marriage
will “rip kids apart emotionally.” The argument proceeds as follows: unmarried people have too
much sex with too many partners, and individual gays and lesbians are the worst offenders,
typically tallying a thousand or more sexual partners over a lifetime. That’s not good for
children. What’s more, in the wake of the rising divorce rate among heterosexuals, blended
families and shared-custody arrangements that confuse children have mushroomed. While this
parade of horribles might support arguments for planned parenthood or pre- and post-marital
counseling, it has nothing to do with same-sex marriage or its effect on kids’ emotional lives.
The website offers clarification: “More than ten thousand studies have concluded that children
do best when they are raised by loving and committed mothers and fathers.” But this
declaration, recalling our discussion of Whitehead, supra, merely restates a well known truism
that has nothing to do with marriage. That children do best when raised by good parents who
function well together is not the least bit controversial, but it happens also not to support a call
for heterosexuals-only marriage. Underneath both Focus on the Family’s and Whitehead’s calls
for marriage reform is a simple message that children suffer without love and support and that
love and support may diminish when parents are distracted by the basic struggle to get along.
Using this message about child welfare as a way of promoting a ban on same-sex marriage at
best seems counterintuitive: the ban will not guarantee love and support even for children who
live together with their married heterosexual parents, and it will do nothing to assuage the
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ravages of divorce. Moreover, if the married family is a locus in which children thrive, we
should do what we can to promote more marriage, not less.
Efforts to outlaw same-sex marriage, if successful, are destined to harm certain children.
Part of the objection to same-sex marriage is that it would allow married gay and lesbian couples
to adopt each other’s children under stepparent adoption statutes. Such adoptions would give the
children of same-sex couples all the legal protections and benefits of having two parents, one of
the primary goals of parentage law.261 As explained above in Part II, children of assisted
reproduction, who in some cases have only one legal parent and a second functional parent they
have known since birth, would benefit the most. Recognizing this fact, the marriage movement
must nonetheless believe that the welfare of these children is the cost required to protect
opposite-sex marriage with a constitutionally enshrined ban on its same-sex equivalent. In the
end, however, the argument that privileging heterosexual marriage is critical to ensuring the
welfare of children falls apart when it comes to light that some children will actually suffer under
such a myopic and rigidly exclusionary view of the value of marriage.

CONCLUSION
Restrictions on adoption and assisted reproduction exist in various forms. Restrictions
based on marital status are particularly prevalent and intractable. Whereas the emphasis on
marriage has fallen away from the regulation of artificial insemination, and whereas single
persons are universally permitted to adopt children (albeit not on equal footing with married
couples), new proposals to regulate surrogacy invariably restrict the use of surrogacy to married
couples. Such restrictions, viewed under an interpretive microscope, fail to achieve the
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minimum standard of consistency and neutrality to which our system of justice adheres.
Furthermore, particularly in adoption, favoritism toward married couples can render some
children unadoptable, an outcome that seems particularly draconian and lacking in integrity.
Given that marriage has for millennia been an important presence in societies throughout
the world, the belief that the world would be unrecognizable in its present form without it is
completely understandable. The marriage movement has for over a decade worked strenuously
to reverse what it sees as a societal decline produced by the divorce culture. To its credit, the
movement seems genuinely concerned with engineering a safer, more salutary society for all. Its
efforts, however, harbor certain alarming traits. Not only do they appear to be unrelated to any
serious consideration of child welfare, but they might well require a return to a form of marriage
that has been discredited as inimical to the equality guarantees of our constitutional system.
Under close scrutiny, the broad, encompassing claims of the marriage movement reduce to a
narrow and uncontroversial truism: children do best when they are raised by loving and
supportive parents. Were this truism to be implemented to the fullest extent, marital restrictions
on adoption and assisted reproduction would be abolished.
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